The Court's 16p opinion is online here. Strib reporting on the decision is online here.
In part, the Court notes word usage, "segregated," vs "racially imbalanced."
If district lines for a particular school within the district have a "racially imbalanced" population with respect to the district as a whole, but the school within such boundaries mirrors the racial balance within drawn boundaries; and apparently without any evidence of boundary definitions being set with an intent to racially imbalance schools within the district, is there fault to be remedied under MN Const. Art XIII, Sect 1, which states:
The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the legislature to establish a general and uniform system of public schools. The legislature shall make such provisions by taxation or otherwise as will secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools throughout the state.
Note that the Constitution mandates a legislative duty, while it is an executive duty to run a statewide school system; with a litigated question arising in the third branch of Minnesota's government focused upon the other two branches. Courts generally are deferential in such situations in "judging" the other two branches, and the only certainty is that intentional "segregation" is unlawful under federal and state law.
It is as if the Appellate Court considers "segregation" as an intentional act to somehow separate or segregate based on race, and "racial imbalance" as a factual situation with no wrongful intent in evidence. And then in that sense the Court of Appeals ruled that intent was needed to prove "segregation" and that the fundamental question still was whether the racial imbalance violated the seldom-litigated Constitutional mandate upon the legislature, as only a few prior cases explain that mandate's reach.
In the Court's analysis, Section A, the Court concludes: "... the certified question is both important and doubtful." That approach and analysis suggests a reach beyond the Court of Appeals is needed and proper, for a certified question of law.
In the Appellate opinion it is noted -
In the conclusion of its order, the district court certified the following question to this court pursuant to rule 103.03(i) of the rules of civil appellate procedure: “Is the Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution violated by a racially imbalanced school system, regardless of the presence of de jure segregation or proof of a causal link between the racial imbalance and the actions of the state?
Rule 10303(i) certification is a seldom used tool available to a District Judge to hand off a question of law to a higher court, absent a final judgement.
The Court of Appeals seems practically to be kicking the case back to the District Court on the question of intent; while a likelihood is a certiorari petition by the Plaintiffs to review this intermediate appellate outcome. A likelihood exists that the Supreme Court would accept certiorari and either conform a decision with what the Court of Appeals decided, or modify that decision in some way, where the Court of Appeals expressly deferred against modifying things per its reading of precedent.
There almost certainly will be a petition to the Supreme Court by the plaintiffs, yet how the Supreme Court would react, accepting or declining certiorari of a clearly impactful question but one where the District Court has not granted a final judgment yet, that yea or nea thing is up in the air. As uncertain as the weather.
It seems judicial economy would best be served by the Supreme Court accepting the narrowed question at this point, rather than declining so that the plaintiffs would have to seek additional proof of some wrong intent, which most likely would be based on circumstantial evidence, since it is unthinkable that any school official would declare an intended segregation outcome was planned from drawing school boundaries within the district as they exist. That is so, whether there was or was not a wrongful intent. It is an inference question when one is not admitted nor proved by undeniable affirmative evidence even when intent is denied by school actors. Since the question as certified likely would arise again in some other case(s), it seems most efficient and wise to directly resolve it now as a key question of law, one way or the other, at the highest court level.
Again, the case is brought under Minnesota's Constitution, suggesting a final decision from Minnesota's Supreme Court would end things, since it is not the U.S. Constitution at issue.
The bet here is the Supreme Court will grant certiorari, since ducking the question now merely kicks the can down the road, while if denying certiorari would kill the question's ever arising again, the Court might defer.
In a sense, DO IT NOW is the sensible thing. Whatever gets finally decided.
