Haaretz earlier reported:
The IDF said rocket fire on the south was expected to continue during a ground operation. The army recommends that a diplomatic exit plan be prepared while a cease-fire agreement is formulated.
While defense officials tend to favor a clear agreement with Hamas, even if it is not enshrined in a written document, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni is considering another idea.
She reportedly believes that it might be better to aim for a situation in which there is no clearly set-out agreement, but Israel would make clear beforehand that it would respond forcefully to any firing from Gaza after hostilities ended.
Olmert, for his part, has conditioned any future truce between Israel and Hamas on the establishment of an international mechanism to monitor the cease-fire.
Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh said Wednesday that Israeli attacks on Gaza had to stop before any truce proposals could be considered. He added in a speech that "the siege must be lifted and all the crossings must be opened because the siege is the source of all of Gaza's problems."
Olmert told cabinet ministers on Wednesday that Israel would not conclude its operation until all its goals had been reached.
Senior Hamas official Ayman Taha said Wednesday that his organization was willing to consider a proposal that would end the Israeli attack and end the siege of the Gaza Strip.
"As soon as we receive a proposal, we will study it," Taha said. "We support any initiative that would end the aggression and lift the siege."
According to Jerusalem sources, Olmert's conditions for a truce were passed on to the United States and other entities in the international community. The U.S. is trying to "sell" Israel's conditions to other groups, including those that talk to Hamas.
"We must reach a long-term and stable cease-fire Hamas will honor," Bush said.
Also on the table is a Turkish-Egyptian push for a cease-fire. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Damascus on Wednesday and is slated to arrive in Cairo today.
Turkish president Abdullah Gul Wednesday told Israeli president Shimon Peres that "Turkey wants a cease-fire that will last."
"Other countries in the region take advantage of Hamas, which could lead to a deterioration in the entire Middle East," he added.
In addition, the European Union is attempting to broker a cease-fire deal. On Monday, a delegation including the foreign minister of the Czech Republican - which currently holds the EU presidency rotation, the Swedish foreign minister and the EU foreign affairs commissioner, is slated to arrive in the region.
In addition, French president Nicolas Sarkozy and foreign minister Bernard Kouchner are scheduled to arrive Monday.
On Thursday, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni will meet the pair in Paris ahead of that visit.
Juan Cole blogs, Angry Arab has this republished Algerian cartoon:
Haaretz homepage. This Haaretz op-ed excerpt:
We so badly wanted to hope that the replacement of the failed defense leadership from the Second Lebanon War, Barak's record as a watch tinkerer and crafty military planner, and the training and re-equipping of the Israel Defense Forces over the past year would result in something new and different. And then indeed it happened: Saturday's air strike gave Israelis a sweet moment of nostalgia for the heroic tales of earlier generations.
But it was an illusion. The Cast Lead got stuck in the throat, just like all previous operations of its type. The war in Gaza is starting to resemble the past confrontations in Lebanon with the Palestine Liberation Organization and Hezbollah. It's hard to stop after carrying out a hard-hitting reprisal action. Israel believes that a little more pressure will prompt the enemy to surrender, but is hesitant to pay the price that would be exacted by a ground operation, and does not want to be dragged into a reoccupation of Gaza.
The only question is which will hold out longer - Hamas or Israeli public support.
Olmert. From the prime minister's perspective, as of yesterday, everything was going according to the plan presented to the cabinet at the outset, aside from two surprises: Hamas was hurt worse than expected, and the Israeli home front was hurt less. There's no reason to stop, or to pressure ourselves, before the goals are achieved. Ehud Olmert decided that the war would be run in accordance with a "success strategy" and not an "exit strategy," and that he would handle all the diplomatic contacts. As of yesterday, he was still waiting for a good proposal from the key international players. Until it is forthcoming, the fighting will continue.
Livni. During this war, the foreign minister is playing a wholly different role than in the Second Lebanon War. Back then, Tzipi Livni acted as a moderating force, opposed to escalation, searching for "exit opportunities" and trying to push Olmert in the direction of diplomacy. This time, Livni situated herself in a difficult position for any foreign minister - to the right of the defense minister. This is what happens when an election is on the horizon.
Yesterday, Livni traveled to Paris for a few hours - not to hold negotiations for a diplomatic accord, but to explain Israel's position to the French. She is wary of an agreement that would grant legitimacy to Hamas, and would like to see the war conclude with "deterrence": Israel will keep on attacking until Hamas stops shooting.
Melancholy thought No. 1. The conflict between Israel and the Arabs is beginning to resemble the wars we studied in history class, the Hundred Years' War and the Thirty Years' War and World Wars I and II. In those conflicts, too, the fighting was not continuous; instead there were outbreaks of concerted violence punctuating periods of calm. So it is with us: Each time the operation has a new name, the objectives change, as does the enemy's identity, but the principle remains the same - one side sees an opportunity to change the status quo to its benefit, and initiates another round of violence. Sometimes it works, as it did for Egypt in 1973. Sometimes, you end up back where you started, as in Lebanon in 2006.
The deal. If the war ends in a draw, as expected, and Israel refrains from reoccupying Gaza, Hamas will gain diplomatic recognition. No matter what you call it - international mediation, a combination of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and his people in Gaza or even "calm plus," Hamas will obtain legitimacy. After three years of some success in isolating Hamas among the international community, Israel is currently searching for mediators who have the phone numbers of Khaled Meshal, the organization's political leader in Damascus, and Mahmoud Zahar, a Hamas co-founder. The Foreign Ministry, which took pride in the quick formulation of an "exit strategy" during the last war, did not properly prepare this time. While the air force was gathering intelligence about targets, the diplomats were not preparing drafts for a cease-fire or building an array of potential mediators for an emergency. This was evident in the chaotic response to the French cease-fire proposal.
Bibi. Benjamin Netanyahu appears to be the war's big loser. His rise in the polls was already stalling, and this week he was left outside the decision-making circle and resumed his old post as an English-speaking talking head on television, while his rivals were busy overseeing the military campaign. This is an illusion, of course. If the operation is successful, Netanyahu will say it's because they listened to his advice. If the operation falls short, Bibi will say that he would have done a better job of it. In the CNN studios, unlike the cabinet room and the chief of staff's headquarters, it's hard to make fateful mistakes. This puts Netanyahu in what will ultimately be a near-certain win-win situation. Unless, of course, Barak manages to bring Gilad Shalit home, to completely crush Hamas in one week, or to pull off some other magic trick.
What has changed since the reprisal operations of the 1950s? Then, Moshe Dayan said, "It was in our power to set a high price for our blood, a price too high for the Arab community, the Arab army, or the Arab governments to think it worth paying." Israel is following the same logic today. The main difference is that today the Arab side has a steadily growing deterrent capability of its own - rocket fire on the Israeli home front - that somewhat balances out the IDF's aerial superiority. Israel showed Hamas that it's not afraid to bomb Gaza, but the rules of the game have changed on the other side, too: Before the war, they fired at Sderot and Ashkelon; now they're firing at Ashdod and Be'er Sheva, too.
Preserving Hamas. The Gaza war has been the first test of the strategy formulated by the IDF after the Second Lebanon War, which holds that if the government is one of terror, then its institutions are to be destroyed. The idea was to threaten the destruction of Lebanon if Hezbollah were to attack Israel again. But its first implementation was in Gaza, where institutions such as the education ministry were destroyed, because it is headed by Hamas. Gabi Ashkenazi's IDF spearheaded the view that Gaza is a Hamas state, while the political echelon was hesitant to call it that.
The experts propounding this strategy recommend that it not be taken too far, that Hamas should still be preserved, so that Gaza doesn't fall apart into a rule of militias and gangs who would be impossible to deter and would continue to launch rockets at Israel. Hit Hamas hard, but don't destroy it completely. Israel needs a "diplomatic address" in Gaza as a basis for armed coexistence. As with Hezbollah in Lebanon.
On that last thought, this earlier op-ed.
For a sampling, al Jazeera homepage, BBC, Globe and Mail, Guardian, Reuters here and here, Egypt in an awkward posture here and here plus Angry Arab (also here, here, here and here), Jerusalem Post here and here, and specific Haaretz items here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here about advance notice to Egypt before Isreali air strikes began, and here. [Photo from here.]The US had its "shock and awe" and "Mission Accomplished" in Iraq; and the truth on the ground was different than from the initial days in the air, as with Israel in Lebanon in 2006; where they had the good sense to draw back.
Would YOU like to see US troops take part in an international "peacekeeping" role at the Gaza border? That idea of an "international force," let them give the contract to Korea, Brazil and Japan, and let the Saudis and Kuwaitis pick up the tab. Somebody has to pick up the tab, and the Isrealis seem to be pointing offshore. Europe, the US, and Arab states would have to stay off the ground - the first two because of past reach at empire, and the latter as having an arguable kinship with the Palestinians. Although Hamas has not had much love from the Sunni monarchs [one obligatory fatwa]. Iran, Syria and Lebanon [Hezbollah included, with talk but not action] have kept their distance. Asian tongue clucking. The Gazans will be going it alone. West Bank leadership has bickered enough to have cause to want a Hamas vacuum to ensue, one they can fill. Or at least they'd prefer containment of Hamas to Gaza, without any strong presence in other neighborhoods.
What else? The grand prize for mootness, you pick, either here or here. Israel's internal op-ed self-doubt, hesitancy and uncertainty, here, here, here, here and here, the last item discussing exit strategy, and portraying Abbas and the Jordanian king as fearfully viewing Hamas as a public health contagion to be kept from spreading.
Finally, Hamas founders were educated and not dummies, and CFR and Wikipedia have background, here and here, respectively.
_____UPDATE________
Here. More balanced, less slanted but with some op-ed, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here. Guardian, here, here, here and here. Opinions differ. AP wire feed, here. Interesting, here and here. Opinions differ. Bush seems to have a simplistic propagandistic view. Hamas denies right of existence to Israel as a state, professes a willingness toward Jewish and Arabs living together in a Palestinian state, with return of refugees being a main point of failures to agree between the camps. Hamas seems to view the Oslo accords as flawed, as do many Israelis. Fatah seems content with the Olso accords, as do many Israelis. Egypt seems content with Fatah, less so with Hamas. Jordan mirrors Egypt, but neither has oil, as the Saudis do. Palestinians in Iraq, see here, here, here and here. In Lebanon, here, here, here and here. The PBS photo is from 1948. The Palestine diaspora. Those displaced have not had an easy time. Return, however, does not seem to be in the cards - at least short or mid-term. Long term, who knows?
