In Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552 (Minn.App. 2006) review denied, March 28, 2006; there was much ado about nothing, including whether one party called the other a "slut." The court held that there was insufficient basis for an allegation that a Minnesota harassment statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague or to be read as so overbraod as to infringe on protected free speech.
As to the "slut" terminology in Dunham, see, Bebo v. Delander, 632 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), where calling someone an "asshole" is not defamatory as it is not truly an allegation of fact. It is metaphor, I suppose.
Truth is always an absolute defense to defamation allegations, and there is much constitutional law on what is a "public figure" and a "quasi-public figure" and in the Internet age, you go on facebook, etc., is that making you a public figure; you post things such as Flickr photos without any "all rights reserved" language and advertise the Flickr photos on a blog, are you making yourself a public figure, or at least a quasi public figure, per New York Times v. Sullivan? Then, even with duly copyrighted material, what is fair use?
What is opinion, musing over possible questions, or such, short of any actual factual contention?
Indeed, the law is quite elastic, and that's why cases are not always settled but sometimes go to trial. If the law were iron-clad certain; and motives were not circumstantially vague, then much uncertainty in the system would not exist.
But the law also is fundamentally reasonable. If you have a beef, try to get it satisfied short of extreme measures - the law expects that of you.
That is one reason why I post an email address on the sidebar.
Although I do not feel I ever have posted anything improper; that address is always there; where the simple act of seeking a retraction and giving reasons why one is due, is always available. It is the reasonable step that should always be pursued as a first measure, if one has a measured mind (free of emotional extremism severe enough to trump such a singularly reasonable and immediate thing as seeking a correction or change before flying off the handle).
That's how I feel reasonable people should operate.
It is a basic core principle that I hold dear to how I feel civil society should function. Contacting me if ever a person feels wronged by anything I put on this blog is hoped for. Wouldn't you want that in my place?
It's to be expected.
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Malicious prosecution claims can be collaterally estopped, where, utimately, “collateral estoppel claims are not determined by measuring the manner in which each party conducted litigation, but rather according to the opportunity to address an issue.” Williamson v. Guentzel, 584 N.W.2d 20, 23-24 (Minn. App. 1998), review denied (Minn. Nov. 24, 1998). One thing interesting about that case is its referencing near the end,
Appellant also contends that summary judgment was improperly granted to Guentzel because he was liable for procuring Fetzer's initiation of the underlying lawsuit against appellant. As support for this proposition, appellant cites Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674 (1965) (one who “takes an active part in the initiation, continuation, or procurement” of civil suit against another liable if suit was wrongful).
Restatements of the law are persuasive authority only and are not binding unless specifically adopted in Minnesota by statute or case law. See Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856, 860 (Minn. 1984) (adopting a portion of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, but rejecting other sections). Appellant has failed to cite any authority demonstrating that Minnesota has adopted section 674 of the Restatement. Because the propositions of section 674 would not establish a claim against respondent Guentzel, we need not decide whether the section governs Minnesota law.
Liability for procurement under the Restatement is not established by merely advising parties or supplying information, but only arises when a party induces a third party to take action either by “insisting” or “urging” that a suit be filed or continued. Id. cmt. c (incorporating Restatement § 655 cmt. c (1965), which specifies that liability is not imposed on one who testifies voluntarily in the prosecution of an action, but is limited to those who insist or urge initiation or continuation of lawsuit).
What that implies, aside from and beyond the facts of that case, is that one can get into trouble instigating and promoting another to initiate or continue a wrongful lawsuit, and this arguably could apply if one spouse causes the other to indulge in wrongful and groundless litigation, or "procures" such actions, "liability for procurement" being the Court's language - which means that separate property of both spouses can in certain situations be put at risk via one spouse's malicious litigation and the other's facilitation of it.
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Another favorite, unpublished but online and a 2009 case, State v. Selnick, which shows the kind of misconduct prosecutors should never get away with but which is a taint on justice that judges are too prone to overlook as harmless error. It is far from that. It is fundamental. You don't ever have to talk to cops if you do not want to, and that's irrelevant to criminal guilt and questions of probable cause to infer a criminal offense happened.
What's interesting to the blogsphere, Minn. Stat. Sect. 690.749, subd. 7, has been around since enactment of the statutory section; 1993 Minn. Laws, ch.326, art. 2, Sect.22. Without that legislative intent clear from the outset that protected speech such as blogsphere political discourse is not to be chilled; the remainder of the statute would be hopelessly unconstitutional by vagueness and more importantly, overbreadth. The legislature knew what it was doing in forcefully articulating a free speech constitutional exception to a statute on harassment. Some judges might have a hard time realizing that, some over-zealous and abusive prosecutors might also, but the exception is there for its purpose.