Strib writes the facts of the decision clearly so readers should access their report.
Strib's report, in part -
Jurors convicted Noor in 2019 of third-degree murder and second-degree manslaughter for shooting Damond while responding to her 911 call about a possible sexual assault in the alley behind her home.
Noor's attorney, Thomas Plunkett, initially appealed the third-degree murder conviction to the Court of Appeals, and when that failed, he petitioned the state Supreme Court in February to review the matter.
The high court heard oral arguments on the issue in June.
Plunkett asked the state Supreme Court to make sense of language in the state's third-degree murder statute, which has perplexed attorneys for years and came into play earlier this year when former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin was tried for the unrelated killing of George Floyd. Jurors convicted Chauvin on April 20 of second-degree unintentional murder, third-degree murder and second-degree manslaughter.
Plunkett asked the state Supreme Court to address two questions: Can a person be convicted of third-degree murder if the deadly act is aimed at a single person, and can the reckless nature of an act alone establish the necessary depraved mind-set?
According to state statute, third-degree murder applies when a defendant kills someone "by perpetrating an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind." The word "others" has led many attorneys to interpret that the statute applies when multiple people are endangered and someone is killed. Veteran attorneys have said it would apply, for instance, to someone shooting indiscriminately into a moving train. The "depraved mind" element has been difficult to define, some attorneys have said.
As to "others" the rookie cop's split-second but well-aimed shooting across his partner's seat through the window endangered both the woman who was shot dead and the partner (were the aim bad), so "others" is less a question than "depraved mind." Any statute so worded craves litigation ad nauseaum.
As a near certainty, somebody somewhere must read Crabgrass and think, "That guy writing that stuff has a depraved mind." The term is that ambiguous, as is my writing. The line between negligence, gross negligence, and reckless disregard is something inexact but at a jury trial that is a fact question for the jury to decide.
However, does "reckless disregard" leading to a death in some circumstances (but not universally) constitute a "depraved mind?" You tell me.
In the common sense of the word "depraved" the man was a policeman selected for the force in the first place for having a level mind. Hopefully that is the standard for cops. And in a split second instance he made a fatal mistake. He did not intend anything commonly thought to be "depraved."
When legislators pass such terrible language, courts have to deal with what they are handed, and are not to blame for any uncertainty embodied in poorly chosen criminal law statutes. Blame the bozo members in the legislature for that ham-handed choice of wording.
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Strib also noted how the Chauvin decision in George Floyd's death involved the same statute. Different facts, surely, no split-second dimension can attach to eight minutes of continuous kneeling on a man's throat, and depraved seems an apt word for such kneeling. Also, since Chauvin was convicted of second degree murder as well as third degree, his sentencing must have weighed more heavily the more serious second degree crime. Yet he's got grounds to appeal, now that the Noor precedent has been overturned. In Chauvin's case the "danger to others" language could be appealed, as Chauvin only kneeled on one throat. There is more spinning that could be done in Chauvin's case, likely future danger, past conduct, etc., as to "others."