Obviously, MSM argues on behalf of free speech and the party protected by the First Amendment, defendant Hoff.
The effort is aimed to be allowed by the trial judge to participate at the post-verdict, pre-judgment phase of pre-appeal proceeding, as a friend of the court (aka, a non-party amicus); the intent being to maximize the likelihood that the trial judge avoids and has every opportunity to avoid reversible error by having all matters fully presented at the trial forum prior to appeal, if any.
Here's a filed page that tells the gist of the amicus motivation to intervene:
John Borger of the Fagre firm is litigating the amicus interest.
Borger litigated for Strib [for its writer Sid Hartman], in the Hunter v. Hartman case; see, e.g., earlier Crabgrassing, here.
Borger is a good choice because blogging is its own special world with its own rules and understandings; much as sports talk radio commentary is a separate forum and kind of speech; per my favorite opinion on defamation as an issue; the Hunter v. Hartman opinion of the court stating in part:
The trial court, although chiefly engaged in considering the sufficiency of appellant's evidence of malice, also observed that the context of a sports radio show was an important consideration, emphasizing the spontaneity of exchanges in that format. Respondent further stresses the relevance of context, describing live sports talk shows as "full of heartfelt but opposing opinions and the dynamic rhetoric of sports commentary." Other authorities have characterized the contextual surroundings of sports commentary less politely. [citation omitted] ("Sports columnists frequently offer intemperate denunciations of coaches' play-calling or strategy, and readers know this and presumably take such railings with a grain of salt * * *.").
545 NW 2d 699, 705-06 (Minn. App. 1996).
How much evidence was put on record by Hoff at trial about the special give-and-take in the blogging world is unclear to me, but it is common knowledge, so universally known that it is something the trial judge could and should recognize, entirely as a matter of common judicial notice. ER 201; Lange v. Nelson-Ryan Flight Service, Inc., 108 NW 2d 428, 466-67 (Minn. 1961).
Reporting about the Hoff trial was unclear at times. I found nothing online indicating whether plaintiff's key witness Don Allen was impeached as to veracity, by his history of having pled guilty to a crime of moral terpitude, (theft by trickery), with the victim reported to have been a bed-ridden veteran Allen "befriended" while the victim was a VA patient.
Allen reportedly accepted a plea change entered consciously and willingly in the course of his attaining alternate diversion.
One might think to do that since the stigma at issue against Moore in the events was connection with mortgage fraude, another crime of moral terpitude; i.e., moral terpitude touching both plaintiff and his witness, as if a thread tying persons together on the plaintiff's side of the litigation, and implying cause for a jury to weigh witness veracity carefully.
Jury Instructions from the trial (online, here) include this page 10:
Underlining indicates the jury was given a preponderance of evidence instruction, not one that clear and convincing evidence was required. The trial judge had to know black letter law on defamation required clear and convincing evidence, after having ruled pretrial that Moore was a limited public figure; see, Hunter v. Hartman, 545 NW 2d 699 at 703; however the jury found for Hoff on the laxer preponderance standard so that Hoff was not prejudiced by the instruction re defamation so no new trial is needed for that matter.
Re tortious interference, the prejudice to Hoff was manifest, in that Minn. Stat. Sect. 544.03 requires clear and convincing evidence when public participation is involved, that being speech or conduct genuinely aimed at procuring a favorable government [UROC, a state agency] action. The evidence was that Hoff was critical not only of Moore, but of the entire UROC personnel situation as making the agency less effective and credible than otherwise. Genuinely thinking his speech might make the agency better, a favorable government outcome, he published, and it was found by the jury on a preponderance of evidence to have been a true publication. The trial judge simply should have known a preponderance standard was improper after her limited public figure status determination for Moore; and to avoid final error, now is the time for amicus to insist that tortious interference should at least be retried with the jury properly told how to weigh the evidence, unless the judge realizes that the immunity of Minn. Stat. Sect. 544.03 wholly insulates Hoff's non-defamatory conduct - in accordance with case authority outside of the SLAPP statute that Borger has cited already in amicus papers.
BOTTOM LINE: Either a new trial on tortious interference is merited, or a judgment of dismissal as a matter of law, as the better and more final remedy fitting law and facts. However, it arguably is essential to protect the record that the motion for a new trial be made along as a motion for judgment as a matter of law; Krueger v. Knutson, 261 Minn. 144, 149-151, 111 NW 2d 526 (Minn. 1961).